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Abstract 
The concussive effects of weapons used on the modern battlefield can cause 
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Indeed, TBI has been termed the "signature wound" 
of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To date, the injury has not been 
taken into account by armed forces in their application of international 
humanitarian law norms regarding attacks that affect civilians. Of particular note 
in this regard are the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions 
in attack. This article opens the discussion about this recently discovered 
consequence of warfare for the civilian population. It examines the state of the 
science regarding TBI and queries whether the understanding of such injuries has 
reached the point at which commanders in the field are obligated to begin 
considering, as a matter of humanitarian law, the risk of causing TBI to civilians 
when they attack enemy forces. It concludes with a practical assessment of how 
they might do so.  
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Introduction 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) has become the “signature wound” of the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The highly effective and very frequent use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during these conflicts, particularly in roadside 
attacks against vehicles and in terrorist attacks against individuals, has spurred in-
depth medical research into blast exposure and related concussively caused brain 
injuries. However, consideration of the legal implications of the phenomenon has 
not kept pace. This Article assesses key international humanitarian law conduct of 
hostilities rules in light of the current state of the science, which is somewhat 
tentative albeit improving, regarding concussive effects. 
Research into combat-related blast exposure began in earnest after World 
War I, during which exposure to artillery fire had been common. As a result, many 
soldiers suffered from what was colloquially known as “shell shock,” the symptoms 
of which included amnesia, headaches, depression, difficulty concentrating, and 
insomnia.2 Although at the time a number of medical researchers characterized the 
condition as commotio cerebri (concussion, an agitation of the brain induced by 
shock waves),3 a debate within the medical community ensued because the soldiers 
appeared otherwise uninjured.  
While purely psychological effects may result from exposure to battle, 
contemporary research is revealing that concussive force generated by blasts 
physically impacts, and causes injury to, the brain.4 Most research on such 
“invisible”5 injuries deals primarily with the diagnosis, treatment, and protection of 
combatants. However, that research is no less applicable to civilians who are 
exposed to the concussive force of a blast when, for instance, they are in the vicinity 
of an attack on a military objective that employs explosive munitions.6  
                                                             
1 Nicholas D. Davenport, The Chaos of Combat: An Overview of Challenges in Military Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury Research, 7 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2016) (reporting that 
approximately seventy-five percent of mild TBI events in these conflicts “involved exposure to 
explosive blast”); see also W. Bradley Fain et al., Lessons Learned from the Analysis of Soldier 
Collected Blast Data, 180 MIL. MED. 201, 201 (2015). 
2 See Edgar Jones et al., Shell Shock and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Historical Review, 164 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1641, 1641 (2007); see also F.W. Mott, Special Discussion on Shell Shock 
Without Visible Signs of Injury, 9 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. i, i–xxiv (1916); F.W. Mott, The Effects 
of High Explosives Upon the Central Nervous System: Lecture I & II, 48 LANCET 331, 336 (1916). 
3 Jones, supra note 2, at 1641–42. 
4 See infra Part I. 
5 Some medical literature uses the term “invisible injury” to refer exclusively to cognitive or 
psychological injuries, while others use it to refer to mild TBI. The authors use it to mean all injuries, 
including physical injuries that are not apparent without the aid of advanced imaging.  
6 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., & 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE U.S.: 
UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM AMONG CURRENT AND FORMER MILITARY 
PERSONNEL 59 (2013) [hereinafter REP. TO CONG.] (recognizing that “civilian blast injuries are 
becoming an increasing problem worldwide”). 
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The potential injury to civilians makes the information now available on the 
concussive effects of blasts relevant to a state’s obligations under international 
humanitarian law. Although it is not unlawful to inflict concussive effects upon 
enemy combatants during an attack on them or in pursuit of other military 
objectives, international humanitarian law is implicated to the extent that civilians 
are affected by a blast’s concussive effects. Proper application and interpretation of 
international humanitarian law must be based on sensitivity to the foundational 
balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns that underpin it, 
regardless of whether the potential injury to civilians is visible or invisible.7 To 
ignore injuries that result from concussive effects would be to throw the balance 
askew.  
To place the inquiry into the relevant international humanitarian law 
context, this Article begins in Part I with a description of concussive brain injuries 
and discusses the state of the science. This Part also highlights certain policy 
approaches to these injuries. The Article then turns to legal issues in Part II. It first 
examines the rule of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that are expected to 
cause excessive injuries to civilians. Even an attack that is consistent with the rule 
of proportionality is subject to the additional requirement to take precautions in 
attack, such as selecting weapons that will achieve the desired combat effect while 
causing the least harm to civilians. Therefore, the application of this rule is likewise 
examined in Part II. Finally, the Article concludes with the authors’ thoughts on 
possible practical means of incorporating the reality of concussive effects into the 
targeting process. 
I. Concussive Effects 
The term “concussive effects” is an acknowledgment that the blast effects 
of munitions—whether the blast wave itself or blast-induced motion or debris—
can include TBIs of varying degrees of severity.8 “Traumatic brain injury” denotes 
a “traumatically induced structural injury or physiological disruption of brain 
function” caused by an external force,9 including those produced by blasts or 
                                                             
7 See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 839 (2010); see also COMMENTARY ON 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 
2206 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC 
COMMENTARY]. 
8 Though some of the medical literature separates blast-induced brain injury from mild traumatic 
brain injury (concussion), the definitions often overlap and the two are used interchangeably. This 
Article uses “concussive effects” to collectively refer to all brain injuries sustained from blast effects 
(blast wave, blunt trauma, or acceleration/deceleration/rotational movement), and “concussive 
injury” to refer to all severities of TBI. See generally INST. OF MED., GULF WAR AND HEALTH, VOL. 
7: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 2 (2009), 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12436.html [hereinafter IOM REP.].  
9 Memorandum from Jonathan Woodson, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Health Aff. to Assistant Sec’ys 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Manpower and Res. Aff.) (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://docplayer.net/49471857-The-assistant-secretary-of-defense-1200-defense-pentagon-
washington-dc.html [http://perma.cc/TL7P-KHZL] [hereinafter OSD Memorandum]. The memo 
adds that at least one of the following signs immediately follows a TBI: “Any alteration in mental 
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explosions.10 Medical literature often describes these forces as the physical cause 
(or mechanism) of immediate injury.11 The injury occurs at the moment of the 
concussive event and causes a mechanical alteration of the brain, including tissue 
destruction—damage to axons or laceration, bleeding, or bruising of the brain—
that immediately leads to macroscopic, microscopic, and cellular pathological 
changes.12 As the brain moves within the skull, axons (the stretched fibers that 
provide structure and support to the brain and communicate with the rest of the 
body) strain and sever. Since the force tears the brain from within, traditional 
radiological imaging often reveals no apparent structural damage.13  
When an individual experiences a TBI, a myriad of biomechanical 
processes in the brain trigger symptoms such as loss of consciousness, headaches, 
confusion, and amnesia.14 The injury may also result in “several biologic processes 
that occur in the minutes to days following TBI.”15 Inflammation, swelling, or 
hemorrhage caused by the original injury can lead to further brain damage as the 
brain pushes against the skull.16 Additionally, concurrent injuries in other parts of 
the body may exacerbate the initial brain injury. For example, injuries sustained to 
other organs might cause blood pressure to drop, which in turn reduces blood flow 
to the brain.17 The reduction can exacerbate the extent or severity of the initial brain 
injury. Severity of the injury and the extent to which it is observable differ 
depending on such factors as the individual’s position relative to the blast, the 
impact to or angular rotation of the brain, and pre-existing brain conditions.18 
                                                             
status (e.g., confusion, disorientation, slowed thinking, etc.). Any loss of memory for events 
immediately before or after the injury. Any period of loss of or a decreased level of consciousness, 
observed or self-reported.” 
10 Id. at 2; see also Louis M. French et al., Traumatic Brain Injury, in CARE OF THE COMBAT 
AMPUTEE 402–03 (Martha K. Lenhart ed., 2009). 
11 REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at 3. 
12 See ERIC SAVITSKY & BRIAN EASTRIDGE, COMBAT CASUALTY CARE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
OEF AND OIF 348 (2012); see also Svetlana A. Dambinova et al., Functional, Structural, and 
Neurotoxicity Biomarkers in Integrative Assessment of Concussions, 7 FRONTIERS IN NEUROLOGY 
1, 4 (2016); Edrea Khong et al., Diffusion Tensor Imaging Findings in Post-Concussion Syndrome 
Patients After Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Systematic Review, 7 FRONTIERS IN NEUROLOGY 1, 
2 (2016); REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at 3. 
13 See Jasmeet P. Hayes et al., The Nature of White Matter Abnormalities in Blast-Related Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury, 8 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 148, 149 (2015); Christine L. Mac Donald et 
al., 5-Year Imaging Sequelae of Concussive Blast Injury and Relation to Early Clinical Outcome, 
14 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 371, 371 (2017); see also REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at 5. 
14 Dambinova et al., supra note 12, at 2. 
15 REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at 3. 
16 See id. at 4. 
17 See id. 
18 See Dambinova et al., supra note 12, at 2; see also Namas Chandra & Aravind Sundaramurthy, 
Acute Pathophysiology of Blast Injury—From Biomechanics to Experiments and Computations, in 
BRAIN NEUROTRAUMA: MOLECULAR, NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL, AND REHABILITATION ASPECTS 
18.1.2.3 (F.H. Kobeissy ed., 2015) (explaining blast physics in various models); HARVEY LEVIN ET 
AL., UNDERSTANDING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
414–17 (2014). 
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TBIs can cause physical, cognitive, and psychological19 impairment. While 
some symptoms manifest immediately, “signs and symptoms may be delayed from 
days to months (e.g., headaches, subdural hematoma, seizures, hydrocephalus, 
spasticity, etc.). [They] may occur alone or in varying combinations, and may result 
in a functional impairment.”20 The consequences may quickly resolve themselves, 
persist for extended periods, or be permanent.21 As discussed below, the 
psychological symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression 
often overlap with the physical symptoms of TBI, making diagnosis and prognosis 
difficult.22 While recent studies suggest that physical damage to brain circuitry may 
account for many of the psychological symptoms associated with combat-induced 
PTSD, the precise relationship between TBI and PTSD is unclear.23  
Irrespective of whether injury results solely from the blast wave or from a 
combination of blast mechanisms, concussive effects cause brain injury.24 Injury 
from the blast wave itself is determined by factors such as pressure intensity, 
duration, and shape (which may be influenced, for instance, by whether the blast 
occurs in an open field or an urban environment).25 Although the effects of blast 
overpressure on organs such as the intestinal tract, ears, and lungs are well known, 
those on the brain are less well understood.26 Two key limitations are the lack of 
testable living brain tissue and the fact that individuals near a blast may also be 
affected by other harmful forces, such as fragmentation of the weapon and other 
blast-induced debris.27 Nevertheless, studies confirm that, at the least, mild 
traumatic brain injuries are likely to result from blast overpressure.28 They also 
substantiate the fact that neurological effects, such as deficits in learning, memory, 
and motor skills, can arise from repeated low-level blast exposure.29  
                                                             
19 The terms psychological, emotional, behavioral, and mental are sometimes used interchangeably 
in various contexts by different fields of expertise. This Article refers to all of these concepts as 
psychological.  
20 OSD Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2. 
21 Id. 
22 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY INCURRED BY 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING 
FREEDOM 3–4 (2017). 
23 Christine L. Mac Donald et al., Outcome Trends after US Military Concussive Traumatic Brain 
Injury, 34 J. NEUROTRAUMA 2206, 2217–18 (2017). 
24 See IOM REP., supra note 8, at 3; see also Hailong Song et al., Linking Blast Physics to Biological 
Outcomes in Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: Narrative Review and Preliminary Report of an Open-
Field Blast Model, 340 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 147, 148 (2016). 
25 There may be further implications for concussive effects in urban operations, where blast waves 
reflect off structures, thereby potentially increasing the concussive severity of the blast. See 
KENNETH CROSS ET AL., ARMAMENT RES. SERV., EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS: 
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO THEIR USE AND EFFECTS 14–16 (2015). 
26 See IOM REP., supra note 8, at 33. 
27 See id. at 36–39. 
28 See id. at 8, 36. 
29 See id. at 8. 
2018 / Invisible Injuries 
 
 
79 
The understanding of concussive effects on the brain has been improving 
dramatically.30 Breakthroughs in advanced imaging techniques are a major 
contribution.31 Also promising is research into the use of brain biomarkers that 
provide, quite literally, a map of various brain injuries.32 By monitoring biomarkers, 
the ability to establish patterns between the initial trauma to the brain and mid- to 
long-term harm is enhanced.33 
However, shortcomings in the knowledge base remain.34 In particular, mild 
TBIs—the predominant consequence of concussive effects—are underreported and 
underestimated.35 Studies using advanced brain imaging technologies reveal that 
mild TBIs do not appear on computerized tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) scans.36 Since traditional diagnostic imaging fails to detect 
pathological changes in the brain caused by a mild concussive injury,37 the most 
common battlefield brain injuries remain “invisible.” Accordingly, they are usually 
only identified through self-reporting, which lacks the empirical fidelity necessary 
for establishing probabilities. Much remains unknown about brain injuries, 
especially the link between blast overpressure and brain injury and between brain 
injury and long-term health outcomes.  
Despite these limitations, the United States and other states have begun 
incorporating medical knowledge of concussive effects into military policy and 
practice. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD), which now defines TBI 
as an “injury,” has reported approximately 375,230 TBIs, eighty-two percent of 
which were classified as mild.38 Note that these figures are drawn from a military 
population that is likely to underreport because of the negative perception within 
                                                             
30 LEVIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 4. 
31 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN A MILITARY 
OPERATIONAL SETTING 2-2 (2015) [hereinafter NATO REP.]. 
32 A biomarker is an indicator that assists in identifying the natural or historical pathology of a 
particular injury, illness, or disorder. Dambinova et al., supra note 12, at 5; see also Chenggang Yu 
et al., A Systems Biology Strategy to Identify Molecular Mechanisms of Action and Protein 
Indicators of Traumatic Brain Injury, 93 J. NEUROSCI. RES. 199, 203–12 (2015). 
33 See Dambinova et al., supra note 12, at 5; NATO REP., supra note 31, at 6-29; REP. TO CONG., 
supra note 6, at 5 (noting that these technologies “must be refined and validated” as they evolve). 
34 REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at xv. 
35 See id.; see also Sardar Bahadur et al., Injury Severity at Presentation is not Associated with Long-
Term Vocational Outcome in British Military Brain Injury, 162 J. ROYAL ARMY MED. CORPS 120, 
120–21 (2016) (finding the injury-severity scoring systems at the point of the concussive event to 
be a poor predictor of long-term outcomes). 
36 See Mac Donald et al., supra note 13, at 371–78; NATO REP., supra note 31, at 2-2; REP. TO 
CONG., supra note 6, at 5. This is problematic given that to be considered a mild traumatic brain 
injury, the U.S. DOD requires that conventional CT or MRI scans reveal normal structural 
neuroimaging. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 6490.11, DoD Policy Guidance for Management of Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury/Concussion in the Deployed Setting 14 (2012) [hereinafter DODI 6490.11]. 
37 See Mac Donald et al., supra note 13, at 371–78; NATO REP., supra note 31, at 2-2; REP. TO 
CONG., supra note 6, at 5.  
38 DEF. AND VETERANS BRAIN INJ. CTR., DOD NUMBERS FOR TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY: 
WORLDWIDE – TOTALS (2017), http://dvbic.dcoe.mil/files/tbi-numbers/WorldwideTotals2000-
2017Q1-Q3Nov%2014-2017508.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GL4-SH6U] (totaling TBI injury numbers 
between 2000 and mid-2017, as of Dec. 10, 2017). 
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the armed forces of having a behavioral problem.39 Clearly, there is a “fundamental 
need to better understand and quantify the direct and indirect effects of blast to 
individuals engaged in modern warfare.”40  
In response to this need, Congress passed the 2008 Traumatic Brain Injury 
Act, which requires certain government agencies to examine the incidence and 
prevalence of TBI and to develop better diagnostic, treatment, and tracking tools.41 
Of particular note, the armed forces incorporated blast sensors (concussion-
monitoring devices) into the helmets of thousands of deploying troops.42 These 
sensors are being upgraded to allow for the identification of a brain injury with 
greater speed and accuracy.43 Concerned with the injury’s “potential for short and 
long-term effects on the Service member,” DOD also now requires “proper 
identification, documentation, treatment, and tracking of those Service members 
who have sustained a TBI.”44 An especially telling indicator of DOD’s 
acknowledgement of TBI as an “injury” is its recognition of even mild TBIs as 
meriting award of the Purple Heart. The award is made in the event of concussions 
caused by “enemy-generated explosions” or mild traumatic brain injuries that result 
in loss of consciousness, persistent symptoms, a clinical finding, or impaired brain 
function for longer than forty-eight hours.45  
Global awareness of TBI is rising because of the increased use of IEDs in 
armed conflict and because of the increase in reported sports-related TBIs. Today, 
many governments recognize TBI as an injury of significant public health and 
                                                             
39 TERRY TANIELIAN & LISA H. JAYCOX, INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY 317 (2008). 
DOD took steps to address this concern in DODI 6490.11, supra note 36. 
40 Fain et al., supra note 1, at 201. 
41 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 721, 120 Stat. 
2083, 2294–95 (2006) (reenacting the TBI Act of 1998). See also REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at 
iv (serving as the third-year, periodic report in response to the law). 
42 Compare Brendan McGarry, Navy Surgeon General Touts Gains in Concussion Protocols, 
Treatments, MILITARY.COM (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.military.com/daily-
news/2015/10/11/navy-surgeon-general-touts-gains-concussion-protocols-treatment.html 
[https://perma.cc/R8YL-2JTL], and Laura Landro, Body Sensors Measure Impact of Blasts on 
Soldiers, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 17, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/body-sensors-measure-
impact-of-blasts-on-soldiers-1384544752, with Letter from Eric K. Fanning, Sec’y of the Army, to 
Louise M. Slaughter, Congresswoman, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter 
SECARMY Letter] (explaining the discontinued large-scale use of current blast sensors due to 
sensor-sensitivity issues, and assuring the Congresswoman that new, better sensors are being tested), 
and Jon Hamilton, Pentagon Shelves Blast Gauges Meant To Detect Battlefield Brain Injuries, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/12/20/506146595/pentagon-shelves-blast-gauges-meant-to-detect-battlefield-brain-
injuries (providing greater insight into the discontinued use of sensors and discussing the need for, 
and future use of, such sensors).  
43 SECARMY Letter, supra note 42; Press Release, Warren Duffie, Office of Naval Research, 
BLAST: Greater Speed, Accuracy in Recognizing Brain Injury, (Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://www.onr.navy.mil/en/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2017/ONR-BLAST-TBI-Protection 
[https://perma.cc/J6MD-FS6B]. 
44 OSD Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1. 
45 U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 600-8-22, Military Awards para. 2-8 (e), (g)(5–6) (July 25, 2015). 
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medical concern.46 Moreover, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed a 
Task Group in 2009 to identify gaps in the understanding of the injury and to 
attempt to devise standard diagnostic and treatment practices for deployment-
related mild TBIs.47  
Of particular significance to the legal issues raised below is the fact that 
TBI-related research involving armed conflict centers on injury to combatants. 
There is, accordingly, a significant lacuna in the knowledge base regarding the 
likelihood of TBI to members of the civilian population. Nevertheless, as with 
combatants, blast injuries among civilian populations are certainly also on the rise 
in light of such factors as the increasing prevalence of urban warfare and of tactics, 
such as human shielding, that move armed conflict into the proximity of civilians. 
Additionally, civilians are especially vulnerable during hostilities because they lack 
protective equipment such as vests and helmets.48 Further complicating matters is 
the fact that assessing concussive effects among the civilian population is 
particularly difficult because they are often located in areas under enemy control, 
lack access to modern medical care, and are not subject to mandatory reporting 
requirements. And while combatants generally fall into a homogenous group in 
terms of age and physical fitness, the heterogeneous category of “civilians” 
includes children, the elderly, and individuals with widely varying physical 
conditions.49 These factors, among others, suggest that the results of research on 
combatant TBI may not be perfectly transferable to the civilian population.  
II. Concussive Effects and International Humanitarian Law  
Concussive effects caused by combat have normative implications 
primarily for the international humanitarian law governing the “conduct of 
hostilities,” specifically in the law of targeting. Targeting law requires (1) that the 
weapon used in an attack be lawful per se in the sense that it is neither inherently 
indiscriminate nor of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury 
to individuals who may be lawfully targeted;50 (2) that the individual or object 
                                                             
46 See generally Min Li et al., Epidemiology of Traumatic Brain Injury over the World: A Systematic 
Review, 1 AUSTIN NEUROLOGY & NEUROSCI. 1, 1–12 (2016); Bob Roozenbeek et al., Changing 
Patterns in the Epidemiology of Traumatic Brain Injury, 9 NATURE REV. NEUROLOGY 231, 231–
36 (2013). 
47 See NATO REP., supra note 31, at ES-1. The phrases “deployment-related” and “military” 
traumatic brain injury include blast-related traumatic brain injury. 
48 Ramona R. Hicks et al., Neurological Effects of Blast Injury, 68.5 J. TRAUMA 1257, 1257 (2010). 
49 See id. 
50 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 35(2), 51(4)(b–c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter AP I]; see also 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Rules 11–13, 70 
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL STUDY]. Although 
the United States is not a party to AP I, it generally accepts those provisions thereof that are cited in 
this Article as reflective of customary international law. See OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 6.6, 6.7 (rev. ed. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL]. 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 9 82 
targeted qualify as a military objective;51 (3) that the tactics employed be 
discriminate;52 (4) that the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects not be 
excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage of the attack, that is, that the 
attack comply with the rule of proportionality;53 and (5) that precautions be taken 
by the attacker to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.54  
Since explosive weapons designed to kill are not per se unlawful, it is 
unlikely that the concussive effects of a particular weapon would significantly alter 
the per se lawfulness analysis.55 Nor do concussive effects directly bear on the 
principle of distinction, the requirement that attacks only be directed at military 
objectives. This is because an attack directed at civilians, civilian objects, or other 
protected persons or objects is unlawful irrespective of the nature of the harm likely 
to be caused. Finally, the international humanitarian law rule that tactics must be 
discriminate likewise has little relevance to the occurrence of concussive effects, 
for merely failing to aim a weapon (as distinct from aiming it at protected persons 
or objects) is unlawful regardless of the effects that weapon causes. The same is 
true with regard to treating a number of targets in a concentration of civilians as a 
single military objective when it is possible to distinguish among them. 
Therefore, concussive effects bear most directly upon the requirements of 
proportionality and precaution, both of which are designed to ensure an appropriate 
balance between humanitarian considerations and military necessity. Codified in 
Articles 51 and 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I), these requirements 
reflect customary international law applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflicts and are, accordingly, binding on all states.56 Injuries to combatants, 
                                                             
51 AP I, supra note 50, arts. 51(1), 52(2); see also CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 7–10; DOD 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 47, § 5.6. 
52 AP I, supra note 50, art. 51(4); see also CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 11–13, at 37–45; DOD 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.5. 
53 AP I, supra note 50, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); see also CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, 
rule 14; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL. AND CONFLICT RES., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, Rule 14 (2009) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]; U.K. 
MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 2.6 (2004) [hereinafter U.K. 
MANUAL]; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
¶¶ 5.3.3, 8.3.1 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
54 AP I, supra note 50, art. 57; see also AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rules 30–40; CIHL STUDY, 
supra note 50, rules 15–19; FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED 
ESSAYS 222 (2007); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.2.3.  
55 The sole situation the authors could conceive of in which this might be the case is a weapon 
designed primarily to cause concussive effects that manifest well after the likely conclusion of the 
conflict, for such injuries would yield no military advantage to an attacker and thus cause 
unnecessary suffering. Obviously, the development and fielding of such a weapon is unlikely. 
56 See CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 14–19; see also Prosecutor v. Kupreskić, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); AMW MANUAL, 
supra note 53, § G, ¶ 2; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 17.7; ICRC COMMENTARY, 
supra note 7, ¶ 4772; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY ¶¶ 2.1.1.4, 2.1.2 (2006); TALLINN MANUAL 
2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS Rules 113, 114–20 (Michael 
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members of organized armed groups, or civilians directly participating in hostilities 
have no normative significance under international humanitarian law as such 
individuals may be lethally targeted by the weapons that produce the concussive 
effects. It is the potential harm to civilians that is relevant to the humanitarian law 
inquiry.  
A. Proportionality 
The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks that “may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”57 It acknowledges that the unintended, albeit 
foreseeable, injury of civilians is permissible when that incidental injury (and 
collateral damage to civilian objects) is not excessive relative to the military gain 
that the attacker reasonably expected to achieve from the attack.  
The science of blast-induced TBI raises the possibility that those who plan 
and conduct attacks must consider concussive effects in their proportionality 
analysis. Such a requirement might be questioned for four reasons. First, concussive 
injuries are not easily foreseeable. Second, a concussive injury may manifest later 
in time, raising questions as to its cause. Third, concussive injuries are sometimes 
characterized as psychological in nature (or intertwined with psychological 
injuries),58 and psychological effects are typically not considered in proportionality 
calculations.59 Finally, concussive injuries might be considered an intangible injury 
and thus not quantifiable in a proportionality analysis. Addressing these and related 
matters requires deconstructing the rule of proportionality into its constitutive 
elements: 1) expectation of harm, 2) causation, 3) qualification as incidental injury, 
and 4) excessiveness. 
1. “May be expected”  
Proportionality analysis considers only incidental injury to civilians and 
collateral damage to civilian objects that “may be expected” to result from an 
attack. From the perspective of a commander planning an attack, then, the inquiry 
is whether concussive injuries are of a nature to be “expected,” as that term is 
understood in the context of the rule of proportionality. Pursuant to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which is generally regarded as setting 
forth accepted modes of interpretation, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
                                                             
N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 53, ¶ 5.23.2; 
U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 53, ¶ 5.3.3. 
57 AP I, supra note 50, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); see also CIHL STUDY supra note 50, 
rules 14, 18–19.  
58 Mac Donald et al., supra note 23, at 12. 
59 See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
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their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”60 The dictionary definition 
of the term “expect” has remained relatively constant since the drafting of AP I. For 
instance, the 1976 Concise Oxford Dictionary defined “expect” as “to regard as 
likely,”61 whereas the present Oxford English Dictionary explains that the term 
denotes something “likely to happen.”62 The drafting history of AP I also sheds 
light on the condition that the incidental injury and collateral damage be expected. 
During the Diplomatic Conference that led to adoption of the treaty, the drafters 
rejected a suggestion to replace the phrase “which may be expected to cause” with 
“which risks causing,” opting instead for an explicit standard of foreseeability.63  
The term “expected” confirms that proportionality is assessed ex ante, not 
post factum.64 In other words, compliance with the rule is judged against what those 
involved in the targeting process foresaw with respect to likely incidental injury 
and collateral damage, not against what happened in the particular case. The law 
imposes the objective standard of reasonableness on this inquiry, such that harm 
that should have been expected in the circumstances will be considered when 
judging compliance with the rule even if the attacker did not in fact expect it.65 
Thus, in explicating the standard, some commentators have phrased it as 
“reasonably foreseeable”66 and “probable.”67  
While it is clear that the incidental injury to be considered in the 
proportionality assessment must be reasonably foreseeable, the question remains as 
to how certain the decision-maker must be of the resulting incidental injury before 
it is foreseeable. As a general legal concept, foreseeability is the point on a 
continuum of certainty at which responsibility for an act attaches.68 If an act’s 
possible effects fall short of this point, there is no duty, and thus no responsibility, 
because the actor could not have reasonably foreseen that the act would cause a 
particular effect. To hold otherwise in the targeting context would impose a form 
                                                             
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
61 Expect, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (6th ed. 1976). 
62 Expect, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/expect (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
63 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 2209. 
64 See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 826; see also MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 1949 320, 352 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter BOTHE COMMENTARY]; KALSHOVEN, 
supra note 54, at 220. 
65 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW 
THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (2000), 
reprinted in 39 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, at 1271, ¶ 50 (2000); see also BOTHE COMMENTARY, 
supra note 64, at 320, 351–52; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, ¶ 5.10.2.2. 
66 Michael N. Schmitt, Air Warfare, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICT 139 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2014). 
67 AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rule 14, ¶ 6. 
68 See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence §§ 413, 416 (2017); see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra 
note 50, § 5.12.2.1 (comparing foreseeable and remote harms). 
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of absolute liability for all injuries causally linked to an attack. As this would 
amount to an unworkable and intolerable burden on parties to a conflict, such a rule 
would run afoul of the balancing of humanitarian concerns and military necessity 
that underlies international humanitarian law.  
In the international humanitarian law context, as in other areas of the law, 
the ubiquitous standard of reasonableness informs where the point of foreseeability 
lies.69 In other words, a result is foreseeable when a reasonable commander or other 
person involved in planning, approving, or executing an attack would have foreseen 
the consequence in question with a reasonable degree of certainty. This has led 
some states, including the United States, to adopt a standard of “reasonable 
certainty,”70 a standard familiar in other areas of international and domestic law.71  
While reasonableness does not require mathematical certainty, the standard 
excludes conjecture and speculation.72 Reasonable certainty is based instead on 
rational inferences and probabilities.73 Whether concussive injuries to civilians are 
reasonably likely to occur, and, therefore, have to be factored into the 
proportionality analysis depends on the probability that the effects will occur in the 
attendant circumstances and the state of the current scientific understanding of TBI. 
It also depends on the extent to which the science can be deemed reasonably 
available to decision-makers at the time of an attack.  
A critical factor in determining whether the science has reached the point 
where it is appropriate to consider concussive injuries is consistency of 
consequence. A degree of consistency is necessary to identify causal relationships, 
as well as the probability ratios from which reasonable expectations that an effect 
will occur must derive. Such consistency appears to be lacking at present, although 
as technologies emerge and further research is conducted, this deficiency may be 
remedied. For example, a 2014 international state-of-the-science conference 
concluded that, despite the use of soldier-worn blast sensor monitoring devices for 
a number of years, there is still no “biomedically valid,” clear safe distance from a 
given blast because the “ability to quantify blast intensity and correlate that data to 
acute and chronic intracranial effects is limited.”74 Based in part on this conclusion, 
                                                             
69 See BOTHE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 320, 351–52; see also AMW MANUAL, supra note 
53, rule 14, ¶ 4 (equating effects that are “too remote” with those that “cannot be reasonably 
foreseen”). 
70 CFLCC ROE Card, reprinted in U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 109 (2015); MNC-
I ROE Cards, reprinted in id. at 110; see also OFF. OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE 
PHIL., AFP STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT § 8f (2005). 
71 See, e.g., Neil Steinkamp, Understanding Reasonable Certainty in International Arbitration, 
LAW360 (May 19, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/654068/understanding-reasonable-
certainty-in-int-l-arbitration [https://perma.cc/UCR8-BYZW]. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 Summary of Meeting Proceedings, Key Findings, and Expert Panel Recommendations, Dep’t of 
Def. Blast Injury Res. Program Coordinating Off., International State-of-the-Science Meeting on 
the Biomedical Basis for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Environmental Threshold Values, at ii (Nov. 
4–6, 2014), 
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the U.S. Army decided in 2016 that mass deployment of its blast sensors would be 
unproductive, citing their lack of sensitivity and explaining that the sensors failed 
to provide consistent data correlating blast overpressure with brain injury.75 The 
Army is now in search of new sensors of greater sensitivity, ones equipped with 
longer battery life, and wireless data transfer.76 
Irrespective of such uncertainty, some countries have implemented blast 
distance thresholds for their soldiers that trigger mandatory TBI screening.77 A 
leader in the field, the U.S. military requires all personnel within fifty meters 
(indoors or outdoors) of a blast event to undergo TBI screening.78 Although this 
policy reflects the potential for, not necessarily the probability of, concussive 
effects, it is nonetheless instructive. The United States recognizes that concussive 
effects, in ways that might not be fully understood yet, lead to brain injury and, 
accordingly, has set thresholds to protect its combatants despite the lack of 
precision in the science.  
To summarize, the science is not yet at the point where it can be said that 
the expectation of concussive injury is reasonably certain in any particular attack. 
It is undeniable that the concussive effects of a blast can cause TBI, but insufficient 
scientific research exists to determine the probability of injury or the distance 
within which such effects manifest. Fortunately, there is current research directed 
at answering these questions.79 Although most is focusing on the safety of the 
armed forces, it would apply mutatis mutandis to the expectation that a civilian will 
suffer an incidental brain injury as a result of an attack. Once the capacity is 
developed to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty the likelihood of civilian 
brain injury within a given blast radius, the “to be expected” aspect of the 
proportionality rule will be satisfied.  
2. “To cause”  
The expected injury an attacker must factor into the proportionality analysis 
is limited to that which the attack “causes.” Unfortunately, AP I provides no 
definition or explanation of causality. Moreover, the treaty’s travaux préparatoires 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the 
instrument offer no insight. Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that both direct and 
indirect effects are included as incidental injury (and collateral damage to objects) 
in the proportionality analysis, so long as they are, as discussed above, 
foreseeable.80 
                                                             
https://blastinjuryresearch.amedd.army.mil/assets/docs/sos/meeting_proceedings/2014_SoS_Meeti
ng_Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/74QD-R2WM]. 
75 SECARMY Letter, supra note 42, at 1. 
76 Id. 
77 See NATO REP., supra note 31, ¶¶ 6.2.2, 6.3.4.1. 
78 See DODI 6490.11, supra note 36, at 9. 
79 See SECARMY Letter, supra note 42, at 1–2. 
80 INT’L LAW ASS’N STUDY GRP. ON THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CHALLENGES OF 21ST 
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Direct effects are “the immediate, first-order consequences of a military 
action . . . unaltered by intervening events or mechanisms. They are usually 
immediate and easily recognizable.”81 Indirect effects are “the delayed and/or 
displaced second-, third-, and higher-order consequences of action, created through 
intermediate events or mechanisms.”82 Although direct effects are typically 
immediate and easily recognizable, they need not be, as is the case with injuries to 
internal organs.83 The concussive effect on the brain is such a direct effect, whereas, 
for instance, an automobile accident occurring later because the brain injury caused 
a loss of consciousness would be an indirect effect.  
The legal challenge with regard to TBIs and causation in the proportionality 
context is two-fold. First, symptoms of the brain injury may not be identified or 
fully develop until well after the attack. Indeed, research is increasingly linking 
longer-term injuries and symptoms to TBIs. The findings of one recent study 
indicate that “a substantial number (74%) of concussive blast TBI service members 
were found to have” brain imaging abnormalities five years after the concussive 
event.84 Conventional imaging taken closer to the concussive event had not 
revealed the abnormalities.85 However, remoteness in time is not a barrier to 
causation. AP I places no temporal limitation on the proportionality rule despite 
calls for such limits at the time of drafting.86 There is no basis for suggesting that 
customary law deviates from its treaty counterpart in this regard. Therefore, the 
mere lapse of time, even if measured in years, does not bar consideration of a TBI 
in the proportionality analysis. Rather, the issues are the foreseeability of that harm, 
discussed above, and actual causation. 
The second challenge is more daunting. To be considered an incidental 
injury, there must be an unbroken causal chain between the attack and the harm 
suffered. In some cases, the individual concerned might have developed the 
condition even without having suffered the brain injury. In others, the attack might 
produce a condition wherein unforeseeable intervening causes interact to produce 
an injury. For example, a concussive brain injury caused by blast exposure might 
later be exacerbated by subsequent, independent brain trauma. In these situations, 
                                                             
CENTURY WARFARE (2016), reprinted in 93 INT’L L. STUD. 322, 352–55 (2017); TALLINN MANUAL 
2.0, supra note 56, rule 113, ¶ 6; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.12.2.1 
(framing the discussion in terms of remote harms rather than direct and indirect effects). 
81 U.S. CHAIRMAN & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JP 3-60, JOINT TARGETING, II-35–36, ¶ 5(e)(1) (2013) 
[hereinafter JP 3-60].  
82 Id. at II-36, ¶ 5(e)(2). 
83 See, e.g., Cassie Barrett & Danny Smith, Recognition and Management of Abdominal Injuries at 
Athletic Events, 7 INT’L J. SPORTS PHYSICAL THERAPY 448, 450 (2012). 
84 Mac Donald et al., supra note 13, at 375–76. 
85 See id. at 374 (arguing that what advanced imaging detected was not simple brain anatomy 
atrophy, but, rather, “degradation of the [brain’s] white matter”); see also Dambinova et al., supra 
note 12, at 4. 
86 BOTHE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 406, ¶ 2.6.2. This is in contrast to the treatment of military 
advantage, which was conditioned by the adjectives “concrete and direct.”  
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causal attenuation or rupture would bar characterization of the ensuing condition as 
incidental injury for the purposes of the proportionality rule.  
However, research is increasingly confirming that many mid- to long-term 
effects are foreseeable sequelae—a medical term denoting a chronic pathological 
condition that is different from, but nonetheless a consequence of, the initial 
injury.87 Of particular note is PTSD, which has been linked recently to concussive 
injury. In a study examining six-to-twelve month trends following concussive 
effects, for example, a “substantial majority” of subjects experienced greater 
depression and more severe PTSD than control groups.88 This result reinforced the 
findings of a 2014 longitudinal study that found increased PTSD severity three 
months post-deployment among active-duty U.S. Marines who sustained 
concussive injuries while deployed.89 However, and of particular relevance in the 
legal context, while the findings identify a “strong link” between concussive injury 
and PTSD, the study was quick to note that the “causality . . . cannot be determined 
from the current results.”90  
Brain injuries are increasingly also believed to be related to a wide array of 
other conditions. For example, a 2009 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report linked 
TBI to long-term conditions like unprovoked seizures, Alzheimer-type dementia, 
Parkinsonism, endocrine dysfunction, growth hormone insufficiency, depression, 
aggressive behaviors, and post-concussion symptoms such as concentration and 
memory loss, dizziness, and headaches.91 The study categorized the relationship 
between TBI and specific symptoms into causal relationships,92 consistent 
associations,93 and suggestive evidence of an association.94 Moreover, all of the 
relevant research that the study located found an association between TBI and those 
secondary adverse effects or illnesses studied.95  
These findings induced changes to U.S. law regarding illnesses that are 
“proximately due” to TBI and deemed service-connected for veterans’ claims 
purposes. The following illnesses are labeled as proximately resulting from a 
service-connected moderate or severe brain injury: Parkinson’s disease, 
                                                             
87 Sequela, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/sequela 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
88 Mac Donald et al., supra note 23, at 2206, 2216. 
89 Id. at 2216. 
90 Id. at 2218. 
91 IOM REP., supra note 8, at 11. 
92 Id. at 112 (defining causal relationship as sufficient evidence of a positive association in human 
studies between brain injury and a specific health outcome and also satisfying a number of factors 
“used to assess causality: strength of association, dose-response relationship, consistency of 
association, temporal relationship, specificity of association, and biologic plausibility”). 
93 Id. (defining consistent association as sufficient evidence of a positive association in human 
studies between brain injury and a specific health outcome where “chance and bias, including 
confounding, could be ruled out with reasonable confidence”). 
94 Id. (defining association as suggestive evidence of a positive association in human studies between 
brain injury and a specific health outcome because “chance, bias, and confounding could not be 
ruled out with reasonable confidence”). 
95 See id. at 112–13. 
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unprovoked seizures, various dementias (manifested within fifteen years of brain 
injury), depression (manifested within three years of brain injury), and hormone 
deficiency diseases (manifested within one year of brain injury).96 The law also 
designates mild TBI as the proximate cause of depression that manifests within one 
year of the initial injury.97  
It must be cautioned that the government noted that it was not, as a matter 
of law, establishing a regulatory presumption of a causal nexus between service-
connected brain injury and these long-term illnesses. Rather, it indicated that the 
IOM report evidence was sufficient to infer a causal nexus. In other words, the 
government was merely codifying “sound medical principles recognized in the 
IOM Report.”98 Moreover, most recent research examined by the report is now over 
a decade old. While subsequent research has strengthened the associations that the 
IOM report noted, no additional comprehensive state-of-the-science studies have 
been completed.99 
The research increasingly suggests a causal link between concussive 
injuries and harm that occurs later. And, plainly, brain trauma is now an accepted 
result of concussive effects. But sufficient granularity is lacking to establish a 
definitive chain of causation for injuries beyond the immediate trauma, much less 
a causal chain that is foreseeable, at least with respect to that degree of causality 
required for application of the rule of proportionality. Recent breakthrough studies 
into mild TBI, for example, contain caveats such as “the long-term impact of [mild 
TBI] is just beginning to be appreciated” (2017);100 “the long-term . . . impact . . . 
remains incompletely described” (2016);101 “the long-term effects . . . are more 
complex” (2016);102 and “the long-term health consequences . . . are not yet well 
known” (2015).103 Additionally, the more time that elapses between the initial 
injury and its manifestation, the greater the opportunity for intervening causes or 
unforeseen exacerbating conditions.  
The requisite causal connection between concussive effects and certain 
mid- or long-term conditions remains tenuous in the contemporary scientific 
literature. Eventually, though, that connection is likely to be reliably established. 
                                                             
96 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(d)(i–iv) (2017). 
97 Id. § 3.310(d)(iv). 
98 Response to Comments on Proposed Rule related to Secondary Service Connection for 
Diagnosable Illnesses Associated with Traumatic Brain Injury, 78 Fed. Reg. 76201, 76206 (Dec. 
17, 2013), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/12/17/2013-29911/secondary-service-
connection-for-diagnosable-illnesses-associated-with-traumatic-brain-injury 
[https://perma.cc/MTL5-AR49].  
99 DOD’s executive agent for blast-related injuries has hosted a number of international state-of-the-
science conferences since 2009, but they focused on narrow topics. See International State-of-the-
Science Meetings, BLAST INJ. RES. PROGRAM COORDINATING OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
https://blastinjuryresearch.amedd.army.mil/index.cfm/sos [https://perma.cc/BFF2-BJSK] (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
100 Mac Donald et al., supra note 13, at 371. 
101 Mac Donald et al., supra note 23, at 2206. 
102 Davenport, supra note 1, at 2.  
103 Hayes et al., supra note 13, at 149.  
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Further research will also likely determine the probability of such conditions 
manifesting. Such probability data are important not only to establish foreseeability 
(relevant to the condition that the incidental injury be “expected”), but also with 
respect to whether an attack will cause future harm as a factual matter. Once it is 
reasonably available, the causal condition precedent to applying the proportionality 
rule to an attack having concussive effects will be satisfied.  
3. “Incidental injury” 
As noted, the rule of proportionality requires incidental injury to be 
“expected,” and it must be “caused” by the concussive effect. However, a perhaps 
more-central question is the meaning of “incidental injury.” It is a difficult question 
in this context because brain injury produces one or more of physical,104 
cognitive,105 or psychological106 consequences.107  
The term “incidental” indicates that the injury is unintended, albeit 
expected.108 However, the meaning of “injury” is less clear, especially with respect 
to cognitive or psychological injuries. No accepted definition of injury exists in 
treaty or customary international humanitarian law. The negotiating history of AP 
I captures debates over qualification as “superfluous injury” under Article 35109 and 
“serious injury” for purposes of accountability under Article 85,110 but there was 
no discussion of the meaning of “incidental injury” as the term appears in Articles 
51 or 57. The 1987 ICRC Commentary and case law are similarly unhelpful.  
It may be that the drafters intentionally left the meaning of the term 
unaddressed. This was the case with respect to the related term “wounded and sick” 
in Article 12 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I. The ICRC’s Commentary on the 
article noted: 
No attempt has ever been made in the Geneva Convention to define 
what is meant by a “wounded or sick” combatant; nor has there ever 
                                                             
104 For example, sensory loss, headache, dizziness, sleep disturbances, uncontrollable muscle 
contraction, inability to understand or express speech, to swallow properly, and seizure, balance, 
and coordination disorders. OSD Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2. 
105 For example, deficits in the mental processes of memory, perception, judgment, comprehension, 
reasoning, learning, production of language, and executive function. Id. 
106 For example, those conditions associated with behavior and emotion, like stress, anxiety, 
depression, irritability, and aggression. Id. 
107 Although cognitive deficits may result from either physical or psychological injuries, such 
deficits after a concussive effect commonly result from physical damage or alteration in the brain; 
however, until recently, the underlying mechanism between the physical damage and the cognitive 
deficit was not well understood. See, e.g., Kirsi Maria Kinnunen et al., White Matter Damage and 
Cognitive Impairment after Traumatic Brain Injury, 134 BRAIN 449, 449–50 (2011). 
108 AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rule 1(l), ¶ 3.  
109 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 1429; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 
50, § 6.6.1. 
110 AP I, supra note 50, art. 85; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 3474; see also Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 121, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
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been any definition of the degree of severity of a wound or a sickness 
entitling the wounded or sick combatant to respect. That is as well; 
for any definition would necessarily be restrictive in character, and 
would thereby open the door to every kind of misinterpretation and 
abuse. The meaning of the words “wounded and sick” is a matter of 
common sense and good faith.111  
In fact, the lack of qualifying or interpretive guidance in this instance points to an 
ordinary reading of the term consistent with the interpretive guidance found in the 
VCLT.112 
The ordinary meaning of injury is “hurt, damage, or loss sustained.”113 
Numerous expert and military manuals support a broad definition by referring to 
incidental injury as harm, without reference to the nature or severity thereof.114 
Moreover, while the text of the rule of proportionality expressly limits anticipated 
military advantage to that which is “concrete and direct,” it imposes no limitations 
on the nature of the incidental injury that qualifies for inclusion in the 
proportionality calculation.115 This being so, and although serious illness and 
disease may not have been discussed at the Diplomatic Conference with respect to 
incidental injury, there is no reason to exclude them from the scope of the term 
                                                             
111 INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
136, art. 12, ¶ 1.C (Jean Pictet ed., 1952). Though AP I subsequently provided a definition of 
“wounded and sick,” the definition necessarily focused on the scope of the protection rather than 
the ordinary meaning of the terms. Article 8 of AP I defines “wounded and sick” as military or 
civilian personnel in need of medical assistance due to “trauma, disease or other physical or mental 
disorder or disability,” and who refrain from hostile acts. This definition explicitly includes pregnant 
women, young children, and the elderly. AP I, supra note 50, art. 8. 
112 Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31. 
113 Injury, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/injury 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/C7AR-F3UX] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also Injury, WEBSTER’S 
SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 435 (1967).  
114 See, e.g., AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rule 1(l), ¶ 4; CHIEF OF THE GEN. STAFF (CAN.), B-GJ-
005-104/FP-021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 204.5 
(2001) (describing incidental injury as “adverse effect upon civilians”); DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.12; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 56, rule 113, ¶ 2. In those 
publications, discussions regarding severity or nature of injury thresholds generally surround only 
the meaning of superfluous injury under Article 35, see AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rule 5(b), ¶ 
4; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, §§ 6.6.1-6.6.3; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, 
¶ 1439, or “attack” in the conduct of hostilities rules, though the latter is usually limited to damage 
to objects, see AP I, supra note 50, art. 49; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 56, rule 92, ¶ 4. 
115 AP I, supra note 50, arts. 51, 57; see also CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 14–21. 
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“injury,” especially since illness is accounted for in Geneva Conventions I,116 II,117 
III,118 and IV,119 as well as in Additional Protocols I120 and II.121  
Given this broad definition, and interpreting the term teleologically in light 
of international humanitarian law’s humanitarian object and purpose, its scope 
would logically extend to known sequelae of TBIs.122 As will be explained, there 
is no convincing rationale for omitting cognitive or psychological consequences of 
a brain injury from “injury.” Further, the exclusion of “inconvenience, irritation, 
stress, or fear” from the broader category of collateral damage by some expert 
manuals, while correct, does not discount such sequelae, for the exclusions relate 
to the general conduct of civilian life, rather than to particular physiologies.123  
Yet, the term could not be interpreted to encompass purely psychological 
harm unrelated to TBI, at least in the current state of the law. While some have 
argued for inclusion based either on analogy to Article 51(2)’s prohibition on the 
spread of terror124 or teleological interpretation,125 their suggested approach is 
aspirational in character. As noted in the travaux préparatoires, the prohibition on 
the intentional infliction of psychological harm (terror) in Article 51(2) “is directed 
to intentional conduct specifically directed toward the spreading of terror and 
excludes terror which was not intended by a belligerent and terror that is merely an 
                                                             
116 See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; see also INT’L COMM. 
FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 1342–1343 (2d ed. 
2016). 
117 See Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85; see also INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF 
ARMED FORCES AT SEA ¶¶ 1380–1382 (2d ed. 2017). 
118 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 110, art. 30; see also INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 
211, ¶ 2 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960). 
119 See Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 16, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO 
GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR art. 
16, ¶ 1 (1958). 
120 AP I, supra note 50, art. 8. 
121 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 7, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶¶ 4636–37. 
122 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 56, rule 92, ¶ 8. 
123 AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rule 14, ¶ 2; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 56, rule 113, ¶ 5. 
Recognizing this distinction, the DOD Law of War Manual juxtaposes, very appropriately, 
inconvenience and temporary disruption of civilian life in general with civilian loss of life, injury, 
and damage to objects. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.12.1.2. 
124 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 56, rule 92, ¶ 8.  
125 Eliav Lieblich, Beyond Life and Limb: Exploring Incidental Mental Harm under International 
Humanitarian Law, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODIES: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ASPECTS 185 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014). 
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incidental effect of acts of warfare which have another primary object and are in all 
other respects lawful.”126 
That said, cognitive or psychological conditions should be understood to be 
encompassed within the “incidental injury” when they are caused by physical brain 
trauma, which undeniably qualifies as incidental injury for the purpose of the rule 
of proportionality when suffered by a civilian. The IOM report mentioned earlier, 
for example, found consistent association between all brain injury severities, 
depression, and aggressive behaviors.127 Post-concussive effect symptoms—such 
as memory and vision impairment, confusion, and a loss of balance—are also now 
explained through biomechanical processes resulting from “variable degrees of 
injury to neurons, glia, the blood-brain barrier, and vascular structures, leading to 
transitory ionic functional disturbances with clinical manifestations.”128 Other 
studies involving blast-exposed patients have demonstrated that abnormalities in 
the brain’s white matter were “significantly” or “directly” associated with physical 
post-concussive symptom severity, albeit not with emotional post-concussive 
symptoms.129 
In fact, physical brain injuries and psychological injuries may “interact in a 
synergistic fashion to worsen outcomes; TBI may damage the brain’s emotional 
regulation circuitry, and the trauma-associated psychopathology may interfere with 
recovery from TBI.”130 Studies have revealed hyperactivity in the brain’s emotional 
processing circuitry in blast-exposed veterans suffering from major depressive 
disorders.131 Blast-induced mild TBI patients also “exhibited a diminished 
interhemispheric coordination of brain activity, which was not the consequence of 
combat-stress symptoms (PTSD or depression) or commonly prescribed 
medications.”132  
Establishing clear-cut distinctions between physical and psychological 
harms for combat-related brain injuries will require further research into the 
relevant brain circuitry affected by concussive effects, if such distinctions are 
possible.133 Scientists anticipate that brain mapping with the use of the biomarkers 
discussed above could allow for better discrimination between cognitive deficits 
and psychological manifestations of physical brain injury on the one hand and, on 
the other, psychological harms in the classic sense. Distinguishing between them 
                                                             
126 XV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 274, ¶ 
51 (1978). 
127 IOM REP., supra note 8, at 11. 
128 Dambinova et al., supra note 12, at 2. 
129 Danielle Miller et al., White Matter Abnormalities are Associated with Chronic Postconcussion 
Symptoms in Blast-Related Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 37 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 220, 221–22, 
226–29 (2017). 
130 Mac Donald et al., supra note 23, at 2218. 
131 See NATO REP., supra note 31, at 7-2. 
132 Id. 
133 See REP. TO CONG., supra note 6, at 74; see also Mac Donald et al., supra note 23, at 13. 
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will remain somewhat contentious until an international medical testing standard 
for physical brain injury induced consequences is adopted.134 
Regardless, the law is clear. All direct physical consequences of a brain 
injury qualify as incidental injury to civilians regardless of the level of severity or 
permanence. There may be obstacles to considering them during the proportionality 
analysis due to the “expected” criterion discussed above, but to the extent that 
science demonstrates that they are “caused” as a result of the brain injury, they 
would constitute incidental injury.  
Incidental injury to civilians is only one factor in the proportionality 
analysis. The injury, in addition to being “expected” and “caused,” must also be 
weighed against anticipated military advantage in a test of excessiveness.  
4. “Excessive” 
Whether expected injuries to civilians are “excessive” in relation to 
expected military advantage is the central question of the principle of 
proportionality.135 Although international humanitarian law provides no definition 
of “excessive,” most commentators agree that excessive does not merely equate to 
“extensive;” injury is compared to advantage, not considered in absolute terms.136 
For example, minor concussive injuries may be excessive if the anticipated military 
advantage is slight, whereas very serious, and even widespread, concussive injuries 
to civilians may be lawful where a sufficiently significant “concrete and direct” 
military advantage is anticipated to result from the attack.137 
The practical difficulty that arises from concussive effects is how to “value” 
them in the proportionality analysis, especially the cognitive or psychological 
manifestations of a brain injury. This difficulty is not limited to such effects; indeed, 
proportionality always involves comparing dissimilar values—harm to civilians 
and civilian property against military advantage. Therefore, the challenge of 
“valuing” concussive effects and their consequences presents no unique legal 
obstacle to application of the rule of proportionality. To the extent that concussive 
effects meet the other conditions of the rule of proportionality, discussed above, 
their weight against military advantage will be determined by a “reasonable 
                                                             
134 NATO REP., supra note 31, at 1–9. 
135 Schmitt, supra note 7, at 804–805. 
136 See AMW MANUAL, supra note 53, rule 14; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 1980 
(“[E]ven if they are very high, civilian losses and damages may be justified if the military advantage 
is of great importance.”); Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian 
Law, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 457 (2005); Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportion and the 
“Reasonable Military Commander”: Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of 
Proportionality, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 299, 316–17 (2015). 
137 See AP I, supra note 50, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); see also CIHL STUDY, supra note 
50, rules 14, 18–19. 
2018 / Invisible Injuries 
 
 
95 
commander” standard.138 The notional “reasonable commander” will assess the 
value of the concussive effects that an attack is foreseeably expected to cause. 
B. Precautions in Attack 
Even an attack against a lawful military objective expected to result only in 
incidental injury and collateral damage that is not excessive relative to its 
anticipated concrete and direct military advantage is subject to the additional 
requirement that all feasible precautions be taken to avoid, or at least minimize, that 
injury or damage. Codified in Article 57 of AP I, the obligation is recognized as 
customary international law.139 It requires an attacker to consider every feasible 
option for avoiding harm to civilians and civilian property in achieving the intended 
military advantage. Thus, the attacker must consider, inter alia, weapons, tactics, 
and target options, and must, when possible under the circumstances, warn a 
civilian population of attacks that may affect it.140 
Article 57 begins by imposing a requirement that, “[i]n the conduct of 
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
civilians, and civilian objects.” 141 Constant care is a humanitarian law principle 
that informs the practical application of the various precautionary requirements that 
follow it in Article 57 (and their customary law counterparts). It also imposes a 
general duty of care on parties to the conflict.142 Although some, like DOD, have 
asserted that the constant care requirement is limited to “planning and conducting 
attacks,”143 the better view is that the duty extends to all military operations, not 
just those that qualify as attacks under international humanitarian law.144 
Accordingly, the requirement to take constant care requires parties to a conflict to 
consider the possibility of harmful concussive effects during operations like 
ordnance disposal, mine clearing, engineering demolition operations, and other 
activities generating concussive effects that may affect civilians negatively.  
Moreover, “constant care” requires military personnel to avoid any harm to 
civilians, not just that which qualifies as incidental injury or collateral damage 
                                                             
138 See Galić, IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 58. 
139 See CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 15–21; see also Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The 
United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 427 (1987). 
140 AP I, supra note 50, arts. 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(c), 57(3); see also CIHL STUDY supra note 50, rules 
15–21; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.3. 
141 AP I, supra note 50, art. 57(1); see also CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rule 15; ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 2191.  
142 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 2191. 
143 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.3.3. An attack is defined in international 
humanitarian law as an act of “violence against the adversary, whether in offense or defense.” AP 
I, supra note 50, art. 49(1). Not all military operations qualify as attacks. See AMW MANUAL, supra 
note 53, rule 1(e). 
144 See Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 
88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 797 (2006); see also U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 
53, at 8-1.  
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pursuant to the rule of proportionality.145 Therefore, the issue of whether concussive 
effects qualify as incidental injury is not relevant with respect to precautions in 
attack. Nor is there a requirement of either definitive expectation of harm or the 
establishment of causation that is not overly attenuated. To the extent that an 
operation may place civilians at risk, the obligation attaches.146 While this 
obligation may sound onerous, some militaries are already taking such care with 
respect to their troops.147  
Most of the remaining precautions requirements, set forth in Article 57(2–
3), apply only to attacks. These include choice of weapon system, tactic, and target, 
as well as a duty to warn. All are subject to a condition of feasibility.148 Feasible 
precautions are “those precautions which are practicable or practically possible 
taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and 
military considerations.”149 The obligation is to act with due diligence and in good 
faith in attempting to avoid harming civilians.150 However, the precautionary 
obligations to consider alternative weapons, tactics, and targets apply only in cases 
in which incidental injury is expected, as those terms were described above.151 
Despite this limitation in the text, the requirement to take constant care nevertheless 
obligates the attacker to avoid negative effects generally on the civilian population. 
                                                             
145 The distinction is clear from the absence of a reference in Article 57(1) to any type of harm. By 
contrast, Article 57(2), which imposes the requirement to take “feasible precautions” in an attack, 
refers to “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects,” that is, the type of 
harm that must be considered in the proportionality assessment. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra 
note 7, ¶ 2191; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 8-1. 
146 The text of Article 57(1) simply requires parties to the conflict to take “constant care . . . to spare 
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.” AP I, supra note 50, Art. 57(1). See also 
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 2191; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 8-
1. 
147 See DODI 6490.11, supra note 36 (establishing procedures for the management of concussive 
injuries in the deployed setting); see also BLAST INJ. RES. PROGRAM COORDINATING OFF., U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., PREVENTION, MITIGATION, & TREATMENT OF BLAST INJURIES: FY 15 REPORT TO 
THE EXECUTIVE AGENT 113 (2015) (detailing the development of sensors to assist commanders in 
determining when service members have reached a concussive injury “safety limit of exposure that 
would put them at risk for long-term [mild] TBI-related medical conditions”). 
148 See G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), at 76 (Dec. 9, 1970) (“In the conduct of military operations, every 
effort should be made to spare the civilian populations from the ravages of war, and all necessary 
precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian populations.”); DOD LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.3.3; Matheson, supra note 139, at 426–27 (“We support the 
principle that all practicable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian 
considerations, be taken in the conduct of military operations to minimize incidental death, injury, 
and damage to civilians and civilian objects, and that effective advance warning be given of attacks 
which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.”).  
149 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
as amended on 3 May 1996 art. 3(10), May 3, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-1 (1997), 2048 
U.N.T.S. 93; see also BOTHE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 404; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra 
note 7, ¶ 2198. 
150 See Michael Bothe, Legal Restraints on Targeting: Protection of Civilian Population and the 
Changing Faces of Modern Conflicts, 31 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 35, 45 (2001); ICRC 
COMMENTARY, supra note 7, ¶ 2208. 
151 See AP I, supra note 50, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rule 17. 
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Feasibility depends on context. The extent of information available to an 
attacker, the weapons systems that can be used to conduct the attack, the need to 
protect the attacker’s forces, and the extent of civilian presence in the target area 
are, inter alia, factors bearing on the feasibility of taking precautions.152 
Precautions are contingent in that a soldier must take them only if doing so is 
reasonable in the attendant circumstances.  
To illustrate, if an attack is likely to cause concussive effects, the attacker 
may need to consider the use of more precise weaponry, weapons with lesser blast 
effect, or advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to help 
reduce the risk of concussive injury to civilians. For instance, consider an attack 
with conventional weapons that is likely to cause concussive effects that can be 
expected to result in incidental injury to civilians, but not otherwise physically harm 
them. If it is feasible to neutralize the target through cyber means, and doing so 
would sacrifice no military advantage, the attacker would be obligated to employ a 
cyber weapon as a matter of law. Other factors that might reduce concussive effects 
include angle at which the target is struck, altitude of release, fusing, munition 
release heading adjustment, and terrain implications. The attacker should also 
consider the possibility of striking alternative targets to achieve the same or a 
similar military advantage if concussive effects are less likely to result from a strike 
on them.  
International humanitarian law also requires an effective advanced warning 
of an attack when it “may affect the civilian population.”153 If one is reasonably 
certain that concussive injuries to civilians are going to be caused by an attack, such 
warnings are required, albeit only to the extent practicable in the circumstances.154 
The active warning area would depend on the likelihood of concussive injury 
occurring, based on the munition used. Note that the warning requirement applies 
whenever the attack will “affect” the civilian population. This being so, the issue 
of whether the concussive injuries qualify as incidental injury is irrelevant; so long 
as it can be expected that the civilian population will be affected, the obligation 
attaches. 
Finally, the defending party has an obligation to take “passive” precautions 
against the effects of an attack.155 Concussive effects would clearly be included in 
the effects that this duty is meant to avoid.156 In fact, the party in control of the 
territory upon which the civilian population is situated is well-positioned to 
minimize concussive injury by avoiding the placement of military objectives near 
civilians or by moving civilians from the vicinity of such objectives.157 Of course, 
                                                             
152 See AP I, supra note 50, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rule 17. 
153 AP I, supra note 50, art. 57(2)(c); see CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rule 20. 
154 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.11.1. See generally Pnina Sharvit Baruch 
& Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to Attack Under International Law: Theory and 
Practice, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 359, 388 (2011). 
155 See AP I, supra note 50, art. 58; CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 22–24. 
156 See AP I, supra note 50, art. 58; CIHL STUDY, supra note 50, rules 22–24. 
157 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 50, § 5.3.1. 
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as noted throughout this Article, the ability of a party in conflict to comply 
effectively with this and other legal obligations depends on the quality of 
information regarding concussive effects that is available to them.  
Conclusion 
Given the current state of science, it is arguably premature to impose a legal 
requirement to consider TBIs, especially their mid- and long-term consequences, 
in proportionality analysis and relevant aspects of the requirement to take 
precautions in attack. Yet, it is clear that as science advances, particularly if 
progress is made in the understanding of concussive effects on the civilian 
population, parties to a conflict could be required to do so as a matter of law. 
Minimizing the harm caused by concussive effects will depend on sound 
and robust operational planning and execution, particularly with respect to 
targeting. Presently, most militaries do not treat concussive injury as incidental 
injury in their prescribed proportionality calculation methodologies. For instance, 
the collateral damage estimation methodology (CDEM) employed by U.S. forces 
addresses the probability of injury to persons within a certain blast radius as a result 
of such factors as primary blast, fragmentation, secondary debris from crater ejecta, 
and blunt trauma from building collapse, but it does not account for effects on the 
brain.158  
However, as the science is refined, reliable threshold values for the 
probability of mild, moderate, and severe TBI within a given blast zone could be 
developed and included in the CDEM to assist in mitigating such injuries. To 
illustrate, a collateral effects radius (CER) with respect to concussive effects could 
be calculated for particular classes of munitions or individual types of munitions.159 
Using a CER, a collateral hazard area—an area within which an unacceptable 
probability of injury exists—can be calculated and assigned a casualty factor.160  
And once greater understanding of concussive effects is acquired, targeting 
processes can accommodate them. Because military attack decisions often occur 
under significant time, space, force, and informational constraints, incidental 
civilian-injury expectations are embedded into rules of engagement and tactics, 
techniques, and procedure protocols.161 The decision-maker is meant to use these 
tools in good faith, under the attendant circumstances, based on all information 
                                                             
158 See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3160.01B, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage 
Estimation Methodology (Dec. 11, 2015). 
159 See id. at E-3 (noting that a collateral effects radius is a value that includes total error probable 
and the radius of primary warhead effects). 
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161 BOTHE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 352 (arguing that tailored rules of engagement and 
observer-controlled training exercises best prepare military commanders for the sensitivities 
involved in conducting a proportionality analysis). 
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reasonably available, to assist in complying with his or her legal obligations.162 
Such tools are designed to ingrain best practices, identify collateral concerns, 
employ mitigation techniques, and assess risk to determine an appropriate approval 
authority for the attack. Due to the “invisible” nature of concussive injury, it will 
be especially critical to account for them in such processes and methodologies.  
While the science continues to develop, concussive effects still must be 
considered to the extent reasonable in the circumstances and in light of the current 
state of the science when conducting military operations because of the obligation 
to take constant care. Indeed, U.S. targeting doctrine encourages planners to 
“consider . . . second-, third-, and higher order effects,” both pre- and post-attack.163 
The doctrine accounts for various categories of effects, including direct, indirect, 
cumulative, cascading, and unintended.164 Moreover, target-development standards 
require taking note of non-physical “collateral effects such as impact on 
communications, electrical power, and other infrastructure.”165 Irrespective of any 
further legal requirement, then, the United States may consider in targeting the 
potential effects of concussive injuries as a matter of policy and good operational 
sense.  
Finally, while technological development may increase the effectiveness of 
attacks and their capacity to cause concussive effects on individuals, it may also 
help clarify the obligations of states under international humanitarian law. As the 
understanding of concussive effects grows, so too will the clarity and granularity 
of relevant obligations under international humanitarian law. At present, states are 
striving to better understand brain injury to their combatants. But the knowledge 
they acquire also will bear fully on their obligations to protect civilians on the 
battlefield, obligations that they must be preparing to shoulder.  
 
                                                             
162 See JOINT TARGETING SCH. STUDENT GUIDE 38, 140–41 (2017), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/jts/jts_studentguide.pdf?ver=2017-12-
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164 See id. 
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